"If You're So Rational, Who Cares?"

I will present several dilemmas of rational choice, cases where it is
puzzling what choice a rational person should make.  I will argue that
we may resolve these puzzles by reflecting upon the work we commonly
call upon talk of "rationality" to do -- including helping to prepare
ourselves and our children so that they will do well in decision
scenarios.  We should attribute "rationality" to choices and choosers
in a way that will best achieve these purposes.  This gives us reason
to reject the commonly accepted Causal Decision Theory, and to embrace
instead the view that I call Disposition-Based Decision Theory.  And,
in particular, this provides interesting new reasons for you to one-box
in Newcomb's problem, and to cooperate in Prisoners' Dilemmas where you
have reason to think the other prisoner is psychologically like you.