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My Philosophical Position Says 'p' and I Don't Believe 'p'

There is typically something strange about asserting or believing Moore-paradoxical sentences - sentences of the form
    'p and I don't believe that p',
    'p and I believe that not-p',
and their ilk. In this paper I want to harness this strangeness to do a particular kind of philosophical work.
  I will argue that various prominent philosophers are committed to asserting and believing various Moore-paradoxical sentences in virtue of the very philosophical positions that they hold. Some of the philosophers in question may be surprised to learn of their commitment and find it unwelcome; others may not be troubled by their commitment and claim that not all Moore sentences are paradoxical after all; still others may positively celebrate their commitment and the paradoxicality, perhaps in the name of notoriety or boldness of thought. In any case, observing the commitment may help lay bare what we find peculiar in these philosophical positions, where previously we may only have had vague feelings of unease; or we may regard the Moore-paradoxical commitments as further reductios of the positions; or we may conclude that not all Moore sentences are paradoxical after all. Whichever way things go, I hope that some philosophical progress will be made.