Report files for Ainsworth v. Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
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\subsection*{Natural area}
\subsubsection*{Instant case}
In recent years courts have tended to imply a duty to observe
the principles of natural justice. It has been said that
``[t]he law has now developed to a point where it may be
accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the
sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of
administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and
legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear
manifestation of a contrary statutory
intention.''\footnote{\frenchspacing{\it Kioa v. West\/}
\nonfrenchspacing(1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584 per Mason~J.}
However, there are some circumstances in which a duty to
observe natural justice will not be implied: ``the law has not
yet reached the stage of applying the obligation of natural
justice to every decision which disadvantages
individuals.''\footnote{\frenchspacing{\it Minister for Arts,
Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd\/}
\nonfrenchspacing(1987) 15 FCR 274 at 306 per Wilcox~J.}
\medskip\noindent In the instant case,
the decision affected the property, right, interest, status,
or legitimate expectation of the applicant;
the decision is apt to have a discrete impact on the
interests of the applicant;
the power is of a nature that would suggest that procedural
fairness would be applied;
the statutory or factual criteria focused on matters which
were discrete to the interests of the applicant;
the decision-maker was not a high-level policy-maker;
there is no statutory right to appeal against the
decision; and
there were no circumstances which would have made an
obligation to observe natural justice inappropriate.
\medskip\noindent In my opinion---following \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann\/}\nonfrenchspacing---%
a duty to observe natural justice is implied.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1990) 170 CLR 596.}
a 1990 decision of
five judges of the High Court of Australia,
a coroner had been conducting an inquest into the death of a
16-year old boy. The boy's parents (Mr and Mrs~Annetts)
sought to make a submission before the coroner made a
finding. The coroner decided that the {\it Coroner's Act
1920\/} (WA) gave him the discretion (which he chose to
exercise) to disallow their submission. The Annettses
appealed.\par The High Court (Mason~CJ, Brennan, Deane,
Toohey and McHugh~JJ) held that their son's reputation
gave the Annettses an interest in the Coroner's inquiry.
``A finding in an inquest into a death is naturally likely
to deal with the conduct of the deceased leading to death.
An unfavourable reflection on the deceased is usually a
matter of concern to her or his parents, spouse or
children and, if they choose to appear at the inquest in
order to safeguard the reputation of the deceased, the
familial relationship suffices, in my view, to establish
the deceased's reputation as a relevant interest which
should not be adversely affected without according natural
justice to those who are seeking to safeguard that
reputation.''\footnote{ibid.\ at~173--4 per
Brennan~J.}\par The Court held that the fact that the
coroner's decision was merely recommendatory (whether or
not to prosecute) was not sufficient to avoid the
implication of natural justice; the coroner was bound to
hear the Annettses before making any finding adverse to
them or their son.\footnote{ibid.\ at~170 per Mason~CJ,
Deane and McHugh~JJ, at~174 per Brennan~J, at~178 per
Toohey~J. Note, however, that Brennan and Toohey~JJ
dismissed the appeal because they believed that the
decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western
Australia (from which the Annettses appealed) was right on
the material before it.}
The instant case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
\medskip\noindent If \frenchspacing
{\it McInnes v. Onslow-Fane\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is followed then a duty to observe natural justice is not implied.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it McInnes v. Onslow-Fane}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{[1978] 1 WLR 1520.}
a 1978 decision of
the Chancery Division of the English High Court,
McInnes had held, at various times, licences to promote,
train and act as master of ceremonies in professional
boxing. All his licences were revoked by the British
Boxing Board of Control. He made five unsuccessful
applications for a manager's licence. With his sixth
application he requested an oral hearing and prior
notification of anything that might prevent the area
council (to which he applied) making a favourable
recommendation to the board. The board refused his
applications without giving him an oral hearing or
informing him of the case against him.\par Megarry~V-C
held that the board was under no duty to provide reasons
to McInnes or to allow him a hearing: ``This is not a case
in which there has been any suggestion of the board
considering any alleged dishonesty or morally culpable
conduct of the plaintiff. A man free from any moral
blemish may nevertheless be wholly unsuitable for a
particular type of work \dots\ In such circumstances, in
the absence of anything to suggest that the board have
been affected by dishonesty or bias or caprice, or that
there is any other impropriety, I think that the board are
fully entitled to give no reasons for their decision, and
to decide the application without any preliminary
indication to the plaintiff of those reasons. The board
are the best judges of the desirability of granting a
licence, and in the absence of any impropriety the court
ought not to interfere.''\footnote{ibid.\ at~223.}
The instant case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it McInnes v. Onslow-Fane}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
Note, however, that \frenchspacing
{\it McInnes v. Onslow-Fane\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is only a decision of
the Chancery Division of the English High Court
and not as good authority as a case decided by
five judges of the High Court of Australia%
---like \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
Consequently, there is nothing in \frenchspacing
{\it McInnes v. Onslow-Fane\/} \nonfrenchspacing
to warrant any change in my conclusion.
\subsubsection*{Hypothetical 1}
Consider the instant case changed so that the following is true:
the statutory or factual criteria focused on matters of
policy or public interest; and
the decision-maker was a high-level policy-maker.
\medskip\noindent If that were so then my opinion would be
that---following \frenchspacing
{\it South Australia v. O'Shea\/}\nonfrenchspacing---%
a duty to observe natural justice is not implied.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it South Australia v. O'Shea}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1987) 163 CLR 378.}
a 1987 decision of
five judges of the High Court of Australia,
O'Shea had been convicted of two offences of indecent
assault of young children. He was released on licence and
remained at liberty after the licence expired. Over a year
later, after allegations had been made against him, O'Shea
was apprehended and detained. The parole board recommended
his release on licence on various conditions, but the
Governor in Council resolved to take no action. O'Shea had
been given a hearing by the Parole Board, but he claimed
he was entitled to a further hearing before the Governor
in Council could exercise his discretionary powers under
s.~77a(7a) of the {\it Criminal Law Consolidation Act,
1935\/} (SA).\par Mason~CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Toohey~JJ
(Deane~J dissenting) held that O'Shea was not entitled to
a further hearing. ``Given the nature of this decision, it
cannot be said that Mr.~O'Shea could have more than a hope
that the Governor would be prepared to act on the
recommendation of the Board. Hope, of itself, is not
sufficient to ground an expectation that will attract
legal consequences. So far as the concept of legitimate
expectation is concerned, Mr.~O'Shea must be taken to know
that the Act committed to the Governor, with the advice
and consent of the Executive Council, the responsibility
for determining where the public interest lay \dots\ The
nature of the decision that they were required to make was
such that participation by Mr.~O'Shea was
inappropriate.''\footnote{ibid.\ at~402 per Wilson and
Toohey~JJ.}
The hypothetical case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it SA v. O'Shea}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
\medskip\noindent If \frenchspacing
{\it Macrae v. Attorney-General for New South Wales\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is followed then a duty to observe natural justice is implied.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Macrae v. Attorney-General for New South Wales}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1987) 9 NSWLR 268.}
a 1987 decision of
the New South Wales Court of Appeal,
five magistrates who had been appointed under the Justices
Act 1902 (NSW) were not appointed under the Local Courts
Act 1982 (NSW). The new Act had reorganized the magistracy
in NSW, and magistrates appointed under the old Act were
entitled to apply for appointment as magistrates under the
new Act. The five had applied and were interviewed.
Allegations were made privately to the Attorney-General
claiming that they were unfit to be appointed, but these
allegations were not brought to their notice at the time
of the interviews.\par The Court of Appeal held that the
Attorney-General's decision not to recommend the
appointment of the magistrates was void because they were
denied their legitimate expectation of procedural
fairness. ``They have not been treated
fairly.''\footnote{ibid.\ at~283 per Kirby~P.}
The hypothetical case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it Macrae v. AG}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
Note, however, that \frenchspacing
{\it Macrae v. AG\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is only a decision of
the New South Wales Court of Appeal
and not as good authority as a case decided by
five judges of the High Court of Australia%
---like \frenchspacing
{\it SA v. O'Shea}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
Consequently, there is nothing in \frenchspacing
{\it Macrae v. AG\/} \nonfrenchspacing
to warrant any change in my conclusion.
\subsection*{Affected area}
\subsubsection*{Instant case}
In the instant case,
the decision did not affect a financial, property or
occupational interest of the applicant;
the decision did not affect the applicant's personal
liberty;
the decision affected the applicant's reputation; and
the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation which
was affected by the decision.
\medskip\noindent In my opinion---following \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann\/}\nonfrenchspacing---%
the decision affected the property, right, interest, status, or legitimate expectation of the applicant.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1990) 170 CLR 596.}
a 1990 decision of
five judges of the High Court of Australia,
a coroner had been conducting an inquest into the death of a
16-year old boy. The boy's parents (Mr and Mrs~Annetts)
sought to make a submission before the coroner made a
finding. The coroner decided that the {\it Coroner's Act
1920\/} (WA) gave him the discretion (which he chose to
exercise) to disallow their submission. The Annettses
appealed.\par The High Court (Mason~CJ, Brennan, Deane,
Toohey and McHugh~JJ) held that their son's reputation
gave the Annettses an interest in the Coroner's inquiry.
``A finding in an inquest into a death is naturally likely
to deal with the conduct of the deceased leading to death.
An unfavourable reflection on the deceased is usually a
matter of concern to her or his parents, spouse or
children and, if they choose to appear at the inquest in
order to safeguard the reputation of the deceased, the
familial relationship suffices, in my view, to establish
the deceased's reputation as a relevant interest which
should not be adversely affected without according natural
justice to those who are seeking to safeguard that
reputation.''\footnote{ibid.\ at~173--4 per
Brennan~J.}\par The Court held that the fact that the
coroner's decision was merely recommendatory (whether or
not to prosecute) was not sufficient to avoid the
implication of natural justice; the coroner was bound to
hear the Annettses before making any finding adverse to
them or their son.\footnote{ibid.\ at~170 per Mason~CJ,
Deane and McHugh~JJ, at~174 per Brennan~J, at~178 per
Toohey~J. Note, however, that Brennan and Toohey~JJ
dismissed the appeal because they believed that the
decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western
Australia (from which the Annettses appealed) was right on
the material before it.}
The instant case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
\medskip\noindent If \frenchspacing
{\it Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is followed then the decision did not affect the property, right, interest, status, or legitimate expectation of the applicant.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1987) 15 FCR 274.}
a 1987 decision of
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia,
Peko-Wallsend held various mining interests in Stage~2 of
Kakadu National Park. Federal Cabinet decided to nominate
Stage~2 for inclusion in the World Heritage List, so it
became ``identified property'' within the meaning of
s.~3(2) of the {\it World Heritage Properties Conservation
Act 1983\/} (Cth). This meant that the Governor-General
could, by proclamation, make mining operations unlawful in
the area. The decision did not affect Peko-Wallsend's
mining rights which were preserved under s.~8B of the {\it
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975\/}
(Cth).\par Before Cabinet's decision, Peko-Wallsend had
lobbied Ministers and other officials extensively, seeking
to preserve their mining interests. After the decision
they commenced proceedings to prevent the Government from
taking any further steps to have Stage~2 nominated on the
World Heritage List, claiming that Cabinet was bound by
the rules of natural justice and had failed to give
Peko-Wallsend an opportunity to be heard. Beaumont~J (a
Federal Court judge) agreed, and held the Cabinet decision
void.\footnote{\frenchspacing{\it Peko-Wallsend Ltd v.
Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment\/}
\nonfrenchspacing(1986) 13 FCR 19.}\par The Full Court of
the Federal Court disagreed. Bowen~CJ decided that ``it
would \dots\ be inappropriate for this court to interfere
to set aside a Cabinet decision involving such complex
policy considerations''.\footnote{(1987) 75 ALR 218
at~225.} Both Sheppard and Wilcox~JJ held that
Peko-Wallsend had had adequate opportunity to put their
case to relevant Ministers and officials before the
Cabinet decision, and were not denied natural
justice.\footnote{ibid.\ at~228 per Sheppard~J, at~253 per
Wilcox~J.} However, Wilcox~J (with whose reasons the other
two judges generally agreed) held that the Cabinet's
decision in this case did not attract the obligations of
natural justice.\footnote{ibid.\ at 253.}
There are several similarities
between the instant case and \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/}\null\nonfrenchspacing:
the decision did not affect a financial, property or
occupational interest of the applicant;
the decision did not affect the applicant's personal
liberty; and
the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation which
was affected by the decision.
However, there is one extremely significant difference
between the instant case and \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
In that case
the decision did not affect the applicant's reputation.
Note also that \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is only a decision of
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia
and not as good authority as a case decided by
five judges of the High Court of Australia%
---like \frenchspacing
{\it Annetts v. McCann}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
Consequently, there is nothing in \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
to warrant any change in my conclusion.
\subsubsection*{Hypothetical 1}
Consider the instant case changed so that the following is true:
the decision did not affect the applicant's reputation.
\medskip\noindent If that were so then my opinion would be
that---following \frenchspacing
{\it Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd\/}\nonfrenchspacing---%
the decision did not affect the property, right, interest, status, or legitimate expectation of the applicant.
\medskip\noindent Details of \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
are summarized above.
The hypothetical case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
\medskip\noindent If \frenchspacing
{\it Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v. Evans\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is followed then the decision affected the property, right, interest, status, or legitimate expectation of the applicant.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v. Evans}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1981) 180 CLR 404.}
a 1981 decision of
five judges of the High Court of Australia,
the Bread Manufacturers claimed that an order made by the
Prices Commission was void. The order affected the
classification of bread products and had an incidental
effect on the price of hamburger buns. The Bread
Manufacturers complained that they should have been given
the right to put their case to the Commission.\par The
Prices Regulation Act 1948 (NSW) provided that a public
inquiry had to be held before an order could be made
setting prices, except where the Minister consented to
dispensing with the inquiry. The Minister had dispensed
with an inquiry before this order was made. Hence, ``[t]he
argument that the Commission was bound to disclose to the
Association the fact that it proposed to make an order
which would have the incidental effect of reducing the
price of hamburger buns can only succeed if the
Commission, although not bound to hold an inquiry, was
bound to observe the rules of natural
justice''.\footnote{ibid.\ at~101 per Gibbs~CJ.}\par The
High Court held that there was no denial of natural
justice in relation to the order, because ``the reduction
of the maximum price in respect of one item was simply a
minor incident in a major revision of the price framework
covering the whole range of bread products. The effect of
that major revision was generally to increase prices.
There was, in our opinion, no obligation on the Commission
to give advance notice of this development or of the
possibility of its occurrence.''\footnote{ibid.\ at~119
per Mason and Wilson~JJ, with whom Murphy and Aickin~JJ
agreed on this point.}
There are several similarities
between the hypothetical case and \frenchspacing
{\it Bread Manufacturers v. Evans\/}\null\nonfrenchspacing:
the decision did not affect the applicant's personal
liberty;
the decision did not affect the applicant's reputation; and
the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation which
was affected by the decision.
However, there is one extremely significant difference
between the hypothetical case and \frenchspacing
{\it Bread Manufacturers v. Evans}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
In that case
the decision affected a financial, property or occupational
interest of the applicant.
Despite the fact that \frenchspacing
{\it Bread Manufacturers v. Evans\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is a decision of
five judges of the High Court of Australia
(and better authority than a case decided by
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia%
---like \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/}\nonfrenchspacing),
there is nothing in \frenchspacing
{\it Bread Manufacturers v. Evans\/} \nonfrenchspacing
to warrant any change in my conclusion.
\subsection*{Expectation area}
\subsubsection*{Instant case}
If the applicant had a legitimate expectation which was affected
by the decision, natural justice may be implied.
``\,`[L]egitimate expectations' \dots\ are capable of
including expectations which go beyond enforceable legal
rights, provided they have some reasonable
basis''.\footnote{\frenchspacing{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/}
\nonfrenchspacing(1983) 49 ALR 123 at~131, per Bowen~CJ,
Sheppard and Morling~JJ.}
\medskip\noindent In the instant case,
the decision-maker did not break a promise or undertaking;
the decision-maker did not go against an established course
of practice;
the decision did not involve a refusal to renew an existing
interest;
neither the decision-maker nor a statutory provision
suggested that an initial interest would be granted;
the decision did not affect an established liberty or
interest; and
there was no standard administrative procedure which the
decision-maker should have followed.
\medskip\noindent In my opinion---following \frenchspacing
{\it Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd\/}\nonfrenchspacing---%
the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation which was affected by the decision.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1987) 15 FCR 274.}
a 1987 decision of
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia,
Peko-Wallsend held various mining interests in Stage~2 of
Kakadu National Park. Federal Cabinet decided to nominate
Stage~2 for inclusion in the World Heritage List, so it
became ``identified property'' within the meaning of
s.~3(2) of the {\it World Heritage Properties Conservation
Act 1983\/} (Cth). This meant that the Governor-General
could, by proclamation, make mining operations unlawful in
the area. The decision did not affect Peko-Wallsend's
mining rights which were preserved under s.~8B of the {\it
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975\/}
(Cth).\par Before Cabinet's decision, Peko-Wallsend had
lobbied Ministers and other officials extensively, seeking
to preserve their mining interests. After the decision
they commenced proceedings to prevent the Government from
taking any further steps to have Stage~2 nominated on the
World Heritage List, claiming that Cabinet was bound by
the rules of natural justice and had failed to give
Peko-Wallsend an opportunity to be heard. Beaumont~J (a
Federal Court judge) agreed, and held the Cabinet decision
void.\footnote{\frenchspacing{\it Peko-Wallsend Ltd v.
Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment\/}
\nonfrenchspacing(1986) 13 FCR 19.}\par The Full Court of
the Federal Court disagreed. Bowen~CJ decided that ``it
would \dots\ be inappropriate for this court to interfere
to set aside a Cabinet decision involving such complex
policy considerations''.\footnote{(1987) 75 ALR 218
at~225.} Both Sheppard and Wilcox~JJ held that
Peko-Wallsend had had adequate opportunity to put their
case to relevant Ministers and officials before the
Cabinet decision, and were not denied natural
justice.\footnote{ibid.\ at~228 per Sheppard~J; at~253 per
Wilcox~J.} However, Wilcox~J (with whose reasons the other
two judges generally agreed) held that the Cabinet's
decision in this case did not attract the obligations of
natural justice.\footnote{ibid.\ at 253.}
The instant case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
\medskip\noindent If \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is followed then the applicant had a legitimate expectation which was affected by the decision.
\medskip\noindent In \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham}\nonfrenchspacing,%
\footnote{(1983) 49 ALR 123.}
a 1983 decision of
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia,
Cunningham had been encouraged to resign from the Public
Service because his superiors believed he had been guilty
of misconduct in the performance of his duties. He had
formed an attachment and begun to live with a Fijian women
whose permit extension application he had processed. He
was threatened with criminal prosecution and told that
``[i]f you resign now it will be a normal resignation and
you'll leave with a clean record.''\footnote{ibid.\ at
125.}\par About eighteen months later, Cunningham sought
reappointment to the Public Service and was told that he
would be offered a position subject to police and ASIO
clearances. The next day he was told that he have been
given an unsatisfactory report based on the earlier
events.\par Bowen~CJ, Sheppard and Morling~JJ held that,
in general, applicants for appointment or reappointment to
the public service are not entitled to natural justice
because they have no legitimate expectation which can be
affected by a refusal to appoint. However, Cunningham did
have a legitimate expectation that any decision to
reappoint him would not be made on the basis of his past
record.
There are several similarities
between the instant case and \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/}\null\nonfrenchspacing:
the decision-maker did not go against an established course
of practice;
the decision did not involve a refusal to renew an existing
interest;
neither the decision-maker nor a statutory provision
suggested that an initial interest would be granted;
the decision did not affect an established liberty or
interest; and
there was no standard administrative procedure which the
decision-maker should have followed.
However, there is one extremely significant difference
between the instant case and \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
In that case
the decision-maker broke a promise or undertaking.
Despite the fact that \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/} \nonfrenchspacing
and \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
are both decisions of
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia,
there is nothing in \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/} \nonfrenchspacing
to warrant any change in my conclusion.
\subsubsection*{Hypothetical 1}
Consider the instant case changed so that the following is true:
the decision-maker broke a promise or undertaking.
\medskip\noindent If that were so then my opinion would be
that---following \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/}\nonfrenchspacing---%
the applicant had a legitimate expectation which was affected by the decision.
\medskip\noindent Details of \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/} \nonfrenchspacing
are summarized above.
The hypothetical case is on all fours with \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
\medskip\noindent If \frenchspacing
{\it Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd\/} \nonfrenchspacing
is followed then the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation which was affected by the decision.
\medskip\noindent Details of \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
are summarized above.
There are several similarities
between the hypothetical case and \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/}\null\nonfrenchspacing:
the decision-maker did not go against an established course
of practice;
the decision did not involve a refusal to renew an existing
interest;
neither the decision-maker nor a statutory provision
suggested that an initial interest would be granted;
the decision did not affect an established liberty or
interest; and
there was no standard administrative procedure which the
decision-maker should have followed.
However, there is one extremely significant difference
between the hypothetical case and \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend}\null\nonfrenchspacing.
In that case
the decision-maker did not break a promise or undertaking.
Despite the fact that \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
and \frenchspacing
{\it Cole v. Cunningham\/} \nonfrenchspacing
are both decisions of
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia,
there is nothing in \frenchspacing
{\it Minister v. Peko-Wallsend\/} \nonfrenchspacing
to warrant any change in my conclusion.
\end{document}
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